Custom has not commonly been regarded as a subject of great moment. The inner workings of our won brains we feel to be uniquely worthy of investigation， but custom， we have a way of thinking， is behaviour at its most commonplace. As a matter of fact， it is the other way around. Traditional custom， taken the world over， is a mass of detailed behaviour more astonishing than what any one person can ever evolve in individual actions， no matter how aberrant. Yet that is a rather trivial aspect of the matter. The fact of first-rate importance is the predominant role that custom plays in experience and in belief， and the very great varieties it may manifest.

    No man ever looks at the world with pristine eyes. He sees it edited by a definite set of customs and institutions and ways of thinking. Even in his philosophical probing he cannot go behind these stereotypes； his very concepts of the true and the false will still have reference to his particular traditional customs. John Dewey has said in all seriousness that the part played by custom in shaping the behaviour of the individual， as against any way in which he can affect traditional custom， is as the proportion of the total vocabulary of his mother tongue against those words of his own baby talk that are taken up into the vernacular of his family. When one seriously studies the social orders that have had the opportunity to develop autonomously， the figure becomes no more than an exact and matter-of-fact observation. The life history handed down in his community. From the moment of his birth， the customs into which he is born shape his experience and behaviour. By the time he can talk， he is the little creature of his culture， and by the time he is grown and able to take part in its activities， its habits are his habits， its beliefs his beliefs， its impossibilities his impossibilities. Every child that is born into his group will share them with him， and no child born into one on the opposite side of the globe can ever achieve the thousandth part. There is no social problem it is more incumbent upon us to understand than this of the role of custom. Until we are intelligent as to its laws and varieties， the main complicating facts of human life must remain unintelligible.

    The study of custom can be profitable only after certain preliminary propositions have been accepted， and some of these propositions have been violently opposed. In the first place， any scientific study requires that there be no preferential weighting of one or another of the items in the series it selects for its consideration. In all the less controversial fields， like the study of cacti or termites or the mature of nebulae， the necessary method of study is to group the relevant material and to take note of all possible variant forms and conditions. In this way， we have learned all that we know of the laws of astronomy， or of the habits of the social insects， let us say. It is only in the relevant material and to take note of all possible variant forms and conditions. In this way， we have learned all that we know of the laws of astronomy， or of the habits of the social insects， let us say. It is only in the study of man himself that the major social sciences have substituted the study of one local variation， that of Western civilization.

    Anthropology was by definition impossible， as long as these distinctions between ourselves and the primitive， ourselves and the barbarian， ourselves and the pagan， held sway over people's minds. It was necessary first to arrive at that degree of sophistication where we no longer set our own belief against our neighbour's superstition. It was necessary to recognize that these institutions which are based on the same premises， let us say the supernatural， must be considered together， our own among the rest.

    commonplace adj. 平凡的

    aberrant adj. 脫離常軌的，異常的

    trivial adj. 微不足道的，瑣細(xì)的

    predominant adj. 占優(yōu)勢的，起支配作用的

    manifest v.  表明

    pristine adj. 純潔的，質(zhì)樸的

    stereotype n.  陳規(guī)

    vernacular n.  方言

    accommodation n.  適應(yīng)

    incumbent adj. 義不容辭的，有責(zé)任的

    preliminary adj. 初步的

    proposition n.  主張

    preferrential adj. 優(yōu)先的

    controversial adj. 引起爭論的

    cactus n.  仙人掌

    termite n.  白蟻

    nebula adj. 星云

    variant n.  不同的

    barbarian n.  野蠻人

    pagan n.  異教徒

    sophistication n.  老練

    premise n.  前提

    supernatural adj. 超自然的

    風(fēng)俗一般未被認(rèn)為是什么重要的課題。我們覺得，只有我們大腦內(nèi)部的活動情況才值得研究，至于風(fēng)俗呢，只是些司空見慣的行為而已。事實小，情況正好相反。從世界范圍來看，傳統(tǒng)風(fēng)俗是由許多細(xì)節(jié)性的習(xí)慣行為組成，它比任何一個養(yǎng)成的行為都更加引人注目，不管個人行為多么異常。這只是問題的一個次要的側(cè)面。最重要的是，風(fēng)俗在實踐中和信仰上所起的舉足輕重的作用，以及它所表現(xiàn)出來的極其豐富多采的形式。

    沒有一個人是用純潔而無偏見的眼光看待世界。人們所看到的是一個受特定風(fēng)俗習(xí)慣、制度和思想方式剪輯過的世界。甚至在哲學(xué)領(lǐng)域的探索中，人們也無法超越這此定型的框框。人們關(guān)于真與偽的概念依然和特定的傳統(tǒng)風(fēng)俗有關(guān)。約翰。杜威曾經(jīng)非常嚴(yán)肅地指出：風(fēng)俗在形成個人行為方面所起的作用和一個對風(fēng)俗的任何影響相比，就好像他本國語言的總詞匯量和自己咿呀學(xué)語時他家庭所接納的他的詞匯量之比。當(dāng)一個人認(rèn)真地研究自發(fā)形成的社會秩序時，杜威的比喻就是他實事求是觀察得來的形象化的說法。個人的生活史首先是適應(yīng)他的社團(tuán)世代相傳形成的生活方式和準(zhǔn)則。從他呱呱墜地的時刻起，他所生于其中的風(fēng)俗就開始塑造他的經(jīng)歷和行為規(guī)范。到會說話時，他就是傳統(tǒng)文化塑造的一個小孩子；等他長大了，能做各種事了，他的社團(tuán)的習(xí)慣就是他的習(xí)慣，他的社團(tuán)的信仰就是他的信仰，他的社團(tuán)不能做的事就是他不能做的事。每一個和他誕生在同一個社團(tuán)中的孩子和他一樣具有相同的風(fēng)俗；而在地球的另一邊。誕生在另一個社團(tuán)的孩子與他就是少有相同的風(fēng)俗。沒有任何一個社會問題比得上風(fēng)俗的作用問題更要求我們對它理解。直到我們理解了風(fēng)俗的規(guī)律性和多樣性，我們才能明白人為生活中主要的復(fù)雜現(xiàn)象。

    只有在某些基本的主張被接受下來、同時有些主張被激烈反對時，對風(fēng)俗的研究才是全面的，才會有收獲。首先，任何科學(xué)研究都要求人們對可供考慮的諸多因素不能厚此薄彼，偏向某一方面。在一切爭議較小的領(lǐng)域里，如對仙人掌、白議或星云性質(zhì)的研究，應(yīng)采取的研究方法是。把有關(guān)各方面的材料匯集起來，同時注意任何可能出現(xiàn)的異常情況和條件。例如，用這種方法，我們完全掌握了天文學(xué)的規(guī)律和昆蟲群居的習(xí)性。只是在對人類自身的研究。只要我們同原始人，我們同野蠻人，我們同異教徒之間存有的區(qū)別在人的思想中占主工導(dǎo)地位，那么人類學(xué)按其定義來說就無法存在。我們首先需要達(dá)到這樣一種成熟的程度：不用自己的信仰去反對我們鄰居的迷信。必須認(rèn)識到，這些建立在相同前提基礎(chǔ)上的風(fēng)俗，暫且可以說是超自然的東西，必須放在一起加以考慮，我們自己的風(fēng)俗和其他民族的風(fēng)俗都在其中。